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[By John Ross, a free-lance journalist who has written on Mexican political and economic affairs for
many years.]
As tensions between political factions in Chiapas threatened to explode into violence just days after
the much-heralded July 6 mid-term elections, several hundred Chiapas state police were rushed to
San Andres Larrainzar, the site of long-suspended peace talks between President Ernesto Zedillo's
government and the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (EZLN). When local officials of the
long-ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) sought to house the police in the large white
building on the public square where the peace talks had once been held, villagers loyal to the EZLN
surrounded the structure and drove off the would-be occupiers with fists and sticks. The melee
graphically illustrated the state of negotiations between the Zapatistas and President Zedillo's
government in the wake of what is being lauded as the most open election in modern Mexican
history.
Although the Zapatistas continue to bridle at Zedillo's veto of last year's accords, which focused
on Indian autonomy and culture, the prospect of peace with an element of justice is still a goal that
the largely Mayan EZLN and its supporters stubbornly refuse to abandon. On the other hand, the
government and its backers, while lending lip service to the resumption of negotiations, seem to be
already working on a post-Zapatista agenda. For Zedillo, the July 6 elections impressed the right
people. International praise was lavished on the president for guaranteeing conditions that led to
important opposition victories and impressed investors.
Both the stock market and the peso have been booming ever since. The US showered Zedillo with
compliments, while the European Union (EU) dropped objections to starting up talks with Mexico
on a free- trade agreement. In Mexico, the elections set off a wave self-congratulations among
politicians of all stripes, the business community, and the hierarchy of the Catholic Church.

EZLN wants government to comply with autonomy accords
Nonetheless, the elections did not much impress some recalcitrant Mexicans closer to the bottom of
the social and economic ladder, most notably, the Zapatistas. "The Zapatistas were not awaiting the
results of the election," said Julio Moguel, an ex-EZLN advisor at the broken-off peace talks. "They
were waiting for Zedillo to comply with the San Andres accords on indigenous autonomy signed by
his own negotiators 18 months ago." For months, the Zedillo government has banked on a post-July
6 clearing of the air between the rebels and the government that would pave the way to new talks.
Even before the vote count had been finalized, newly appointed chief negotiator Pedro Joaquin
Coldwell called a press conference to postulate that "the elections establish the conditions under
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which the EZLN can transform itself into an organized, institutionalized political force." "The
EZLN's participation will enrich the spectrum of Mexican democracy," said Coldwell, implying that
this "transformation" was already a done deal. The Zapatistas' response to Coldwell's exaggerated
leap of faith was the same stony silence the rebels have maintained for months now. During the
lengthy electoral campaigns, the EZLN only addressed the July 6 balloting once, on the eve of
the vote, condemning the party system and urging its supporters to stay away from the polls.
"Silence is an Indian weapon," wrote the EZLN's charismatic spokesperson Subcomandante
Marcos. For his part, Bishop Samuel Ruiz of San Cristobal de las Casas warned that the democratic
aspirations of many Mexicans, buoyed by the July 6 vote, will be "just the flower of one day unless
the Chiapas crisis is peacefully resolved." Ruiz was instrumental in creating the Comision Nacional
de Intermedicion (CONAI), which for months has been trying to convince the two sides to return to
the bargaining table.
The government's miscalculation that opposition gains in the July 6 balloting would jump-start
new talks with the EZLN is compounded by what turned into an election day fiasco in Chiapas,
the most glaring stain on the electoral map and one which Zedillo has a hard time sweeping under
democracy's rug. Prior to the elections, Subcomandante Marcos called for a boycott of the balloting,
which stimulated EZLN mobilizations that shut down enough polling places to nullify elections
in three Chiapas congressional districts. The governing Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)
claims victory in all three districts.
Moreover, the threat of violence and the presence of at least 30,000 military troops in the region kept
Chiapas residents away from the polls. According to state electoral officials, only 35% of registered
voters in Chiapas participated in the elections. The high absenteeism in the state was accompanied
by charges of vote-buying, tampering with ballot boxes, and even computer fraud. "This was no
way to convince the EZLN to return to the negotiating table," said former gubernatorial candidate
Amado Avendano of the center-left Partido de la Revolucion Democratica (PRD). Avendano
received strong support from the EZLN in his 1994 campaign for governor. Even if the elections in
the three disputed districts claimed by the PRI are voided and new elections called, Avendano said
he is not hopeful that the rebels will resume negotiations.
Indeed, the Zapatistas have never found the electoral process very user-friendly. During the 1994
race for governor, Avendano's candidacy was neutralized by a combination of heavy spending
by the PRI, low-intensity fraud, and a suspicious auto accident which limited campaigning by the
PRD candidate in the final weeks leading to the election. The EZLN has opposed the party system
because partisan politics have tended to divide indigenous communities. One clause of the San
Andres accords calls for election by consensus in majority Indian municipalities, rather than the
government's paper ballots. The Zapatistas have prohibited their members from running for elected
political office, although they have endorsed the principle of independent nonparty candidates.
Regarding the July 6 process, Marcos considered the vote worthless. "Why vote for a Congress
that takes its orders from Zedillo and has refused to accept the San Andres accords?" Marcos
rhetorically asked reporters. Despite Marcos's push for a boycott of the elections, the July 6 vote
produced significant alterations in the Mexican power structure. PRD Candidate Cuauhtemoc
Cardenas became the first-ever elected governor of Mexico City, and the PRI narrowly ceded its
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automatic majority in the lower house of Congress. But even though a resurgent PRD has pledged to
place peace in Chiapas at the top of its legislative agenda, the Congress will not be able to override
Zedillo's veto of the autonomy agreement, the essential ingredient for resuming peace talks.

Support for peace process still unclear in new Congress
The San Andres accords contemplate constitutional changes that require a two-thirds majority,
which can only be obtained through a PRD alliance with members of the PRI and/or the centerright Partido Accion Nacional (PAN). The PRI delegation in the new Chamber of Deputies includes
several veterans of the Chiapas campaign who would likely oppose approval of the accords.
The most prominent of the new PRI deputies is Gen. Miguel Angel Godinez, who was in charge
of the armed forces during the battle with the EZLN in 1994. The PRI deputies also include the
government's former chief negotiator, Marco Antonio Bernal, and former interior secretary Esteban
Moctezuma.
In addition, the PRI delegation includes Roberto Guillen, a rancher with land holdings inside the
conflict zone. The incoming Chamber of Deputies must decide whether to retain or eliminate the
legislative commission for Chiapas (Comision Nacional de Concordia y Pacificacion, COCOPA).
Given the current composition of the Chamber of Deputies, including 239 PRI and 121 PAN
members, the elimination of COCOPA is feasible if President Zedillo decides to cut his losses and
abandon all efforts to restart the peace talks. In public statements since the elections,
Zedillo has aggressively revived the claim that the San Andres agreement his own negotiators
signed in February 1996 would replicate a sort of tropical Bosnia in southeastern Mexico, allowing
indigenous peoples to secede and establish their own independent nations. At a La Raza Unida
convention of US Latinos in Chicago, the Mexican president reiterated his "Balkanization" theory
and urged the Zapatistas to abandon "their rhetorical rebellion." EZLN expands support in Europe
The EZLN has also attempted to shore up its support overseas.
On July 25, a second Zapatista-inspired gathering "in defense of humanity and against
neoliberalism" got under way in Spain. The gathering follows a similar event in the Lancandon
Jungle in 1996. Breaching the military encirclement of their jungle community of Guadalupe
Tepeyac, an EZLN stronghold in the Lacandon, EZLN representatives Dalia and Felipe joined 3,000
sympathizers in Spain to spread the Zapatista credo to the Old World and strategize against the
rapid globalization of economies and cultures. Dalia and Felipe, who are Tojolabal Mayans, brought
with them ears of new corn to demonstrate the resistance of the Mayan "People of Maize" to the
Mexican government and its neoliberal model. "We have sent these delegates because they are our
best argument," Marcos wrote in a note of introduction. The gathering in Spain is evidence that the
EZLN's support network is growing in Europe, with new groups of young anarchists springing up in
France, Germany, Italy, and on the Iberian peninsula.
The Spain event also coincides with the Zedillo administration's efforts to negotiate a free-trade
agreement with the 15-member EU. Such an agreement is a critical piece in Mexico's strategy to
diversify dependency upon the US and reverse a heavy trade deficit with the EU. The EU-Mexico
negotiations have been stalled by among other things the EU's insistence on including a "democracy
clause" in an accord with Mexico. The clause, spelled out in the EU charter, focuses on guarantees
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of fundamental human rights. In contrast, Mexico's trade pact with the US and Canada the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) contains no such provisions.
According to an EU official, the July elections showed good faith on the part of the Mexican
government and could represent the needed "flexibility" for negotiations to move forward. Formal
negotiations on a free-trade treaty between Mexico and the EU began on July 23 and are expected
to last throughout 1998. However, the EZLN contends that Mexico is far from meeting the criteria
for the "democracy" clause. Subcomandante Marcos issued a statement for participants at the rally
in Spain urging them to resist any EU-Mexico accord. According to the EZLN, the government's
refusal to recognize indigenous rights, widespread militarization, rampant human rights violations,
and severe hunger among the nation's indigenous population, present the EU with good arguments
to refuse to negotiate an agreement with Mexico.

-- End --
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